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247 
FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND THE 
SECURITY STATE 
Kerry Abrams* 
When does an individual’s interest in reunification with a 
family member outweigh a sovereign nation’s interest in 
controlling its borders? This question, long debated by courts, 
legislators, and policy-makers, is now emerging as an important 
civil rights issue for the general public. President Donald J. 
Trump’s recent executive orders banning immigrants from several 
predominantly-Muslim countries had the effect of separating 
spouses from spouses, parents from children, and children from 
grandparents.1 These separations were quickly seized upon in the 
media as violations of human decency and civil rights.2 Although 
courts granted injunctions of the orders primarily due to the 
likelihood that enforcement of them would violate the procedural 
due process rights of green-card holders and the free exercise of 
religion rights of Muslims, the issue of family reunification was 
raised in some of the cases and mentioned briefly in court 
 
 * Professor of Law, University of Virginia. Thank you to Kristin Collins, Brandon 
Garrett, Jill Hasday, and Doug NeJaime for their helpful comments and to the Association 
of American Law Schools for providing a forum to present the paper. 
 1. See Executive Order: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the 
United States (Jan. 27, 2017); and revised version (Mar. 6, 2017). 
 2. See, e.g., Elise Foley, Trump’s Executive Order Is Already Hurting Refugees, 
Muslims, and Families, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28, 2017). http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/entry/trump-muslim-refugee-ban_us_588cb24ee4b0176377948a09 (quoting a woman 
sponsoring a Syrian refugee family as saying, “Just imagining raising a child in a refugee 
camp environment and then being told you could see your family again, you could be 
reunited with your mom and your daughter’s grandma and being told ‘No, sorry, you’re 
three days too late for that’ ― I can’t imagine what that’s like”); Amy La Porte & Azadeh 
Ansari, They Were Hoping To Get to the U.S. – and then Trump Banned Them, CNN 
POLITICS (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/28/politics/trump-visa-ban-families-
refugees-stories/ (relating stories of several families separated by the travel ban); Michelle 
Gallardo & Eric Horng, Families Splintered, Stranded by Trump’s Immigration Order, 
ABC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2017), http://abc7chicago.com/news/families-splintered-stranded-by-
trumps-immigration-order/1728752/ (quoting that sister of a refugee who was detained as 
saying, “This is just a nightmare I’ll wake up from, and this is not true. This is not 
happening. I wish I can do that.”). 
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opinions.3 The family reunification question will likely be 
addressed more fully soon, either in the cases already filed or 
cases brought in response to new, more carefully crafted orders. 
When a court does directly address this issue, what will the 
answer be? I argue that today, courts will recognize family 
reunification as an interest of constitutional import, and will 
balance that interest against the genuine national security 
interests of the government. Understanding why this is so requires 
an analysis of the shifting and complex relationship that the right 
to family unity and the government’s power over immigration 
have had since our nation’s founding. These two principles have 
always been in conflict, but their relative strength has waxed and 
waned over time. Today, our constitutional jurisprudence has 
become nuanced enough that the individual rights of families can 
be balanced with the interests of the state. 
In this Article, I trace the history of this relationship, 
exploring the major shifts and upheavals. I argue that family rights 
and the federal immigration power have had three very different 
relationships over time. In the first period, family rights were 
robust but extraconstitutional, a bedrock assumption of how 
American democracy operated. Regardless of whether the nation 
was in a mode of conquest and expansion (and therefore 
encouraged European migration to help “civilize” the new 
nation), or in a mode of restriction (actively circumscribing 
immigration), family relationships were assumed by courts, 
administrators, and citizens to be important enough that they 
could override the state’s interest in regulating its borders. In the 
second period, which began roughly with the quota system in the 
1920s and continued roughly through the 1980s, courts shifted to 
conceiving family rights and the immigration power as conflicting 
with one another, and when pressed they usually found that the 
government’s interest in restricting immigration and protecting its 
borders outweighed the interests of individual families in 
reuniting. Most recently, as family law itself has become 
“constitutionalized,” a new understanding is emerging, whereby 
individual family members have a constitutionally protected 
interest in their relationships, and the state’s national security and 
border regulation interests are recognized still as significant but 
 
 3. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1166 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) 
(noting that, even if green card holders were not covered by the executive order, 
“applicants who have a relationship with a U.S. resident” might have claims to assert). 
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must be balanced with these interests. This latest balancing trend 
is not unique to the particular relationship between family 
reunification and the immigration power, but that relationship is 
an important, and underappreciated, example.4 
This argument necessarily paints history with a broad brush. 
It goes without saying that the trends I observe here were never 
universal and always contested, as many scholars have explored 
at length elsewhere.5 Today’s family law, constitutional law, and 
even immigration law still contain vestiges of these other periods.6 
I argue, however, that over large periods of time, we can begin to 
discern changes in the tide: a change in the common 
understanding of “rights” in general and “family rights” in 
particular, a change in courts’ understanding of the role of the 
federal government in national security and border regulation, 
and a change in the relationship of individual rights to this power. 
This argument proceeds as follows. Part I explores the 
common law concept of “family rights” and their relation to 
migration during, first, a time of expansion, and second, a time of 
restriction. Part II explores the rise of what I call the “security 
state,” and the use of the plenary power doctrine to bolster 
congressional and executive power at the expense of family unity. 
Part III examines recent United States Supreme Court cases that 
call this doctrine into question, showing how, taken together, they 
point to a new understanding of the balance between the 
 
 4. For a classic examination of the rise of constitutional balancing, see T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987). 
 5. See CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN (1998); 
NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000); 
MARTHA MABIE GARDNER, THE QUALITIES OF A CITIZEN: WOMEN, IMMIGRATION, 
AND CITIZENSHIP, 1870-1965 (2005); GEORGE ANTHONY PEFFER, IF THEY DON’T BRING 
THEIR WOMEN HERE: CHINESE FEMALE IMMIGRATION BEFORE EXCLUSION (1999); 
Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacy of Coverture, 28 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 593 (1991); Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and 
the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134 (2014); Rose 
Cuison Villazor, The Other Loving: Uncovering the Federal Government’s Racial 
Regulation of Marriage, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1361 (2011); Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: 
On Asian American History and the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 405 (2005). 
 6. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 841 
(2004) (showing that family law scholars often overstate the extent to which coverture has 
been “vanquished and excised from the law of marriage”); Reva B. Siegel, The 
Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Women’s Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 
1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2210 (showing that “when a society undertakes to 
disestablish caste relations, it may instead translate them from an antiquated and therefore 
socially dissonant discourse to a contemporary and socially acceptable discourse”). 
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government’s interest in maintaining its borders and citizens’ 
interests in maintaining their families. Family reunification is a 
right, but it does not outweigh legitimate national security 
interests. Congress and the Executive enjoy power over 
immigration, but not to the extent that they can arbitrarily ignore 
family ties. 
I. THE AGE OF THE UNITARY FAMILY 
The text of the United States Constitution makes no mention 
of family. The Bill of Rights enumerates the right of the people to 
peaceably assemble, to keep and bear arms, to be secure in their 
persons against unreasonable searches and seizures, and many 
other specific rights, but the right to marry, the right to beget or 
bear children, the right to make decisions about the welfare of 
one’s child, or the right to live with a family member are nowhere 
mentioned.7 
Also absent from the U.S. Constitution is a general power 
over immigration. True, the Migration Clause precluded 
Congress from prohibiting the migration or importation of people 
prior to the year 1808,8 but this clause was widely understood to 
euphemistically refer to the slave trade.9 The Constitution does 
grant Congress the power to “establish a uniform rule of 
Naturalization” (e.g., a rule for creating new citizens)10 and with 
Reconstruction came the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
provided citizenship to anyone born on U.S. soil.11 A general 
authority over the admission and removal of noncitizens, 
however, is conspicuously absent.12 
The textual absence of family and immigration from the 
Constitution reflects the social and political conditions under 
 
 7. Bruce Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy: 
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 473, 571 (1983). 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
 9. See, e.g., FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) (referring to the clause as 
referencing the slave trade and decrying those who would interpret it as “calculated to 
prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to America”). 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. 
 11. Id. amend. XIV (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside”). 
 12. See Sarah Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, 
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEXAS L. 
REV. 1, 81 (2002). 
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which it was written, and deep-seated assumptions about both 
family and migration, none of which is still true today. Over the 
years, courts have developed a constitutional jurisprudence of 
family rights for individuals and immigration powers for the 
government. 
For America’s founders, and, indeed, for the first hundred 
years of the country’s history, the family was a central, but 
unspoken, undergirding principle of democratic theory. As Nancy 
Cott has described it, the founders’ “political theory of marriage” 
was “so deeply embedded in political assumptions that it was 
rarely voiced as a theory”; it “occupied the place where political 
theory overlapped with common sense.”13 At the center of this 
theory was the notion of marital unity. The common law “turned 
the married pair legally into one person—the husband.”14 Under 
the doctrine of coverture, a married woman lost her ability to 
manage her own property, enter into contracts, or establish an 
independent domicile. A husband’s authority and responsibility 
over his household also extended to his children.15 These family 
structures were inflexible status relationships. As Joanna 
Grossman and Lawrence Friedman have noted, “in the 
nineteenth century, in general, when two people married, they 
opted into a status that was clearly defined for them by law. . . . 
Marriage was a public institution; the state had a heavy stake in 
supporting it; and its terms were, in general, controlled by law, not 
individuals.”16 These terms were deeply gendered; marriage 
slotted men and women into particular roles that it was very 
difficult to resist. Women who tried, like Myra Bradwell, to 
fashion a different role for themselves, found that the institution 
of marriage itself could prevent them from doing so. When 
Bradwell sued the State of Illinois for its refusal to admit her to 
the bar, the Supreme Court sided with the state. Justice Bradley 
famously opined that it is a woman’s “paramount destiny and 
mission to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and 
mother.”17 
 
 13. COTT, supra note 5. 
 14. Id. at 10. 
 15. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated 
Law of Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299, 314–15 (2002). 
 16. JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW 
AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 60 (2011). 
 17. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141–42 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
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The common law understanding of family was also reflected 
in citizenship law. In 1855, Congress passed a statute that granted 
automatic citizenship to a woman who married a citizen, provided 
she was a “free white person” as required by the naturalization 
statute.18 The statute also granted citizenship to the children of 
American male citizens.19 Conversely, the 1907 Expatriation Act 
took away citizenship from a woman who married a foreigner.20 
This statute was famously upheld in MacKenzie v. Hare, where it 
was challenged by Ethel MacKenzie, a wealthy San Franciscan 
who had married a British citizen but remained with him in 
California. The Court justified her expatriation using the 
language of coverture. “The identity of husband and wife,” it held, 
“is an ancient principle of our jurisprudence.”21 
In the early days of the United States, this principle of family 
unity and the immigration power were rarely in tension with one 
another. The overwhelming goal of the nation was to expand its 
borders and settle new territory; it had not yet begun to actively 
restrict immigration, with the exception of ending the slave trade 
in 1808 and the Federalist Congress and President John Adams’s 
attempt, through the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, to quash pro-
French sentiment.22 The national government encouraged 
westward migration and immigration from Europe through acts 
such as the Donation Land Act and the Homestead Act.23 
Sometimes these inducements mobilized the unitary family to 
further the goals of settlement. The Donation Land Act, for 
example, provided twice as many acres to married settlers as it did 
to single ones24 with the intent to “produce a population” through 
the “encouragement of the women to peril the dangers and 
hardships of the journey.”25 
 
 18. Act of 1855, 10 Stat. 604 (reenacted as 1 Rev. Stat. 350, § 1994 (1878)). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Expatriation Act, ch. 2534, §§ 3–4, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228–29 (1907). 
 21. MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915). 
 22. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801); Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 
1 Stat. 577; Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570; Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 
(repealed 1802). 
 23. Oregon Donation Act, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496 (1950), amended by Act of July 17, 1854, 
ch. 84, 10 Stat. 305; Homestead Act, 12 Stat. 392, 394 (1862). 
 24. Oregon Donation Act, ch. 76, 9 Stat. at 497. 
 25. Letter from Samuel R. Thurston to the Members of the House of 
Representatives, Thurston Papers, quoted in Richard H. Chused, The Oregon Donation 
Act of 1850 and Nineteenth Century Federal Married Women’s Property Law, 2 LAW & 
HIST. REV. 44, 58 (1984). For a more detailed analysis of the role of land acts in 
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This harmony began to change in the 1870s, when Congress 
passed its first exclusionary immigration statutes. At first, these 
targeted Chinese immigrants.26 The Chinese had come to the 
United States, like many immigrants, during the Gold Rush in the 
late 1940s, and were later recruited to build the Central Pacific 
Railroad.27 In 1869, the railroad was completed, and many 
Chinese moved to major urban centers on the West Coast. 
Simultaneously, a severe economic drought depressed wages and 
led to pervasive unemployment, and many white westerners 
blamed their economic troubles on the Chinese.28 Later statutes 
excluded categories of people (e.g., criminals, paupers, the insane, 
and those with communicable diseases) deemed undesirable 
regardless of their race or national origin.29 These new restrictions 
reflected a growing anxiety about the ability of the nation to 
absorb people who were poor, uneducated, and members of 
religious minorities (Catholics and Jews).30 In sharp contrast to 
the previous decades, the broad consensus was that national 
interest now lay in selectively discouraging, rather than fostering, 
immigration. 
The Chinese people who were denied entry or deported 
under these statutes actively contested the new laws. When their 
cases reached the Supreme Court, the Justices responded with 
opinions justifying federal control over immigration. As there was 
no direct textual support for the notion that the political branches 
of the federal government had this authority, the Court looked to 
structural arguments. “Jurisdiction over its own territory [to 
exclude aliens] is an incident of every independent nation. It is a 
part of its independence.”31 So the Court opined in Chae Chan 
 
encouraging westward migration, see Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of 
Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1353 (2009). 
 26. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 20, § 300B, 18 Stat. 318 (reaffirming Asian 
immigrants’ ineligibility for citizenship); Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58 
(1882) (repealed 1943) (suspending migration of Chinse laborers to the U.S. for a period 
of ten years); Page Law, ch. 141, 19 Stat. 477 (1875) (repealed 1974) (banning the 
immigration of women who had entered into contracts of “lewd and immoral purposes” 
and setting forth enforcement mechanisms targeting Chinese women). 
 27. LUCY SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE 
SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 8 (1995). 
 28. Id. at 9. 
 29. Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, §1, 26 Stat. 1084. 
 30. SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION 
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, STAFF REPORT (1981), cited in ALENIKOFF ET 
AL, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 165 (6th ed.). 
 31. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889). 
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Ping v. United States, where it upheld the law excluding Chinese 
laborers from the country. The Court also analogized the 
immigration power to other “incident[s] of sovereignty,” 
including the powers to “declare war, make treaties, suppress 
insurrection, repel invasion, regulate foreign commerce, secure 
republican governments to the States, and admit subjects of other 
nations to citizenship.”32 
The Court expanded on its initial holding in another case 
concerning a Japanese immigrant named Nishimura Ekiu, who 
claimed that she was the wife of a man already in the United 
States.33 Her passport stated that she was traveling with him, but 
she clearly was not. She said she planned to go to a hotel and wait 
until her alleged husband met her there.34 The immigration 
examiner found Ekiu excludable under an 1891 statute as “likely 
to become a public charge.”35 She in turn claimed that principles 
of due process required her to be granted a hearing, but the Court, 
referring to the power of the “political department of the 
government” over immigration, rejected her claim.36 The 
following term, the Court expanded its understanding of 
immigration authority still further to the deportation context, 
holding that Congress’s power to “expel or deport foreigners . . . 
rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified 
as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the 
country.”37 The notion that the political branches of the federal 
government—Congress and the Executive—have exclusive 
power to regulate the nation’s borders became known as the 
“plenary power doctrine.”38 Importantly, this doctrine developed 
long before modern equal protection doctrine had developed.39 
 
 32. Id. at 604. For a detailed account of the development of the plenary power 
doctrine in Chae Chan Ping, see Cleveland, supra note 12, at 124–33. 
 33. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892). 
 34. Id. at 652. 
 35. Id. at 662. For an exploration of the case and discussion of the treatment of 
unmarried women as prostitutes or paupers, see KEVIN JOHNSON, THE HUDDLED MASSES 
MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 126 (2004). 
 36. Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659. 
 37. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893). 
 38. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: 
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547, 551–
552 (1990) (defining plenary power and identifying these cases as the origins of the 
doctrine). 
 39. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding segregation as 
consistent with equal protection principles). 
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By the time Congress began actively regulating immigration 
in the 1880s, the common law notion of the unitary family headed 
exclusively by a husband and father had begun to unravel, at least 
at the state law level. Many states had passed married women’s 
property acts, which enabled wives to keep their separate 
property upon marriage.40 The women’s suffrage movement was 
actively advocating for a national right to vote and western states 
were already beginning to allow women to vote.41 But these 
changes afoot represented a slow disintegration and 
transformation, not an overnight revolution.42 The common law 
theory of marital unity was still so powerful that family unity was 
treated with extraordinary deference—even in the face of an 
articulation of the immigration power that made the state’s 
authority sound absolute. 
Consider, for example, the case of Chung Toy Ho and Wong 
Choy Sin, the wife and child of a Chinese merchant named Wong 
Ham.43 Mr. Wong was a well-known Chinese merchant living in 
Portland, Oregon. Under the Chinese Exclusion Act and 
subsequent statutes, Chinese laborers were excluded from entry 
to the United States.44 Per treaty, some classes of Chinese people 
were allowed to enter, namely “teachers, students, merchants, or 
[people who proceed] from curiosity; together with their body and 
household servants.”45 Those who were members of these favored 
classes were required by statute to obtain a certificate from the 
Chinese government stating the person was entitled by the statute 
to come to the United States and granting permission to do so.46 
 
 40. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 7, 1848, ch. 200, 1848 N.Y. Laws 307 (enabling a married 
woman to receive and hold to her “sole and separate use” real and personal property, 
removing such property from the control of the husband and protecting it from liability for 
his debts). 
 41. T.A. Larson, Woman Suffrage in Western America, 38 UTAH HIST. Q. 8, 19 
(1970). 
 42. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning 
Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994). 
 43. In re Chung Toy Ho, 42 F. 398 (C.C.D. Or. May 23, 1890). 
 44. Scott Act, ch. 1064, § 1, 25 Stat. 504 (1888) (repealed 1943) (restricting entry of 
all Chinese laborers); Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115 (repealed 1943) (amending 
and adding certificate requirement to Chinese Exclusion Act); Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 
126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943) (suspending migration of Chinse laborers to the 
U.S. for a period of ten years). 
 45. Treaty Between the United States and China, Concerning Immigration, Nov. 17, 
1880, U.S.-China, 22 Stat. 826. 
 46. Act of 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115. 
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These statutes made no mention of wives or children. Read 
literally, the statutes prohibited them from entering the United 
States without a certificate, because “‘every Chinese person,’ 
other than a laborer,” who was entitled to come had to acquire a 
certificate.47 It would have been very difficult for many of them, 
including Chung Toy Ho and Wong Choy Sin, to demonstrate that 
they were entering as merchants, teachers, or students; their true 
purpose in entering was as the family members of a merchant. 
Hearing their case, Judge Deady of the District Court of 
Oregon construed the statute to allow their entry. He conceded 
that they were “‘Chinese persons,’ and therefore within the letter 
of the statute” but concluded that, in his judgment, “they are not 
the ‘persons’ contemplated by [C]ongress in the passage of the 
act.”48 “Chinese women,” he explained, “are not teachers, 
students, or merchants,” so obtaining the required certificate 
would be impossible. But, he continued, “as the wives and 
children of ‘teachers, students, and merchants,’ they do in fact 
belong to such class.”49 The judge also observed that the treaty 
allowed a merchant to bring with him his “body and household 
servants,” and concluded that “[i]t is impossible to believe that 
parties to this treaty, which permits the servants of a merchant to 
enter the country with him, ever contemplated the exclusion of his 
wife and children.”50 The opinion concludes by holding that if a 
Chinese merchant is entitled to enter the United States he is 
therefore entitled to bring his wife and children with him. “The 
company of the one, and the care and custody of the other, are his 
by natural right; and he ought not to be deprived of either, unless 
the intention of [C]ongress to do so is clear and unmistakable.”51 
Thus, for Judge Deady, the “natural right” of a husband and 
father to the “care and custody” of his wife and child had to be 
considered when construing a federal statute that, on its face, 
demanded an opposite result. Many other cases were litigated 
during this period, some agreeing with Judge Deady’s rationale52 
 
 47. In re Chung Toy Ho, 42 F. at 399 (examining Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 
115 (repealed 1943)). 
 48. Id. at 399 (interestingly, Judge Deady’s son, Paul R. Deady, represented the 
Chinese petitioners in the case). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 400. 
 52. In re Lee Yee Sing, 85 Fed. Rep. 635 (D. Wash. 1898); United States v. Gue Lim, 
83 Fed. Rep. 136 (D. Wash. 1897). 
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and some rejecting it.53 In 1900, the United States Supreme Court 
finally addressed the issue, and sided with Judge Deady. In United 
States v. Mrs. Gue Lim, the Court that the wives and children of 
Chinese merchants were entitled to enter the United States 
without a certificate of their own.54 Justice Peckham, writing for 
the Court, observed that a Chinese wife “may have [had] no 
former, and may have no present, occupation or profession.”55 To 
require her to obtain a certificate would mean that she “cannot 
come into this country at all . . . . She must come in as the wife of 
her domiciled husband or not at all.”56 The Court reached the 
same conclusion for the children of Chinese merchants, 
explaining, “They come in by reason of their relationship to the 
father.”57 
The cases involving Chinese women occurred within a 
specific racialized context in which Congress had attempted to 
severely limit Chinese migration while still leaving open the 
possibility of trade between nations and the migration of Chinese 
from upper classes necessary to effect that trade. These cases can 
be seen as examples of how common law notions of family rights 
operated to protect family unity in spite of the racialized nature 
of the regulatory scheme. But principles of family unity also 
operated to exclude. The “family” protected by the principle of 
family unity was married and monogamous. When immigrants—
especially those who were nonwhite—did not fit this definition of 
family, the principle of family unity was no help to them. In these 
instances, courts questioned the legitimacy of particular family 
structures, and thus made palatable the exclusion of family 
members from entry or sometimes even citizenship.58 
I do not want to overstate the extent to which the common 
law understanding of the unitary family was a “right.” Judges such 
 
 53. In re Ah Quan, 21 Fed. Rep. 182, 186 (D. Cal. 1884); In re Ah Moy, 21 Fed. Rep. 
785 (D. Cal. 1884); In re Wo Tai Li, 48 Fed. Rep. 667 (N.D. Cal. 19894); In re Lum Lin 
Ying, 59 Fed. Rep. 682 (D. Or. 1894); In re Li Foon, 80 Fed. Rep. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1897). 
 54. United States v. Mrs. Gue Lim, 176 U.S. 459 (1900). 
 55. Id. at 466. 
 56. Id. at 468. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 5 (showing how children born abroad to U.S. citizen 
fathers were denied citizenship when they were born in countries where some people 
practiced polygamy or born outside of marriage); Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, 
and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641 (2005) (showing how 
second-wives of Chinese immigrants were labeled “prostitutes” for immigration purposes 
and therefore excluded). 
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as Judge Deady may have referred to family unity as a husband 
and father’s “natural right,” but this notion was substantially 
different from how we understand rights today. Before the advent 
of international human rights and the constitutionalization of 
individual rights, natural rights were part of the fabric of society 
and informed how courts and legislatures understood the scope of 
their power but were not cognizable rights on their own. 
Importantly, these “rights” simultaneously conferred authority on 
husbands and fathers and undermined the autonomy of wives and 
children. Sometimes, wives and children benefited from the 
family unity principle, by obtaining access to immigration or 
citizenship statuses for which they otherwise would not have been 
eligible. Sometimes, however, their inability to claim family 
reunification as an independent right meant that they lost their 
citizenship (as in the case of women who married foreigners) or 
were deprived of it in the first place (as in the case of children of 
nonmarital citizen fathers). Despite these important caveats, 
however, the “right” to family unity during this age was strikingly 
significant—strong enough to override serious government 
interests in border protection and immigration control. 
II. THE AGE OF SECURITY 
Chinese and Japanese exclusion paved the way for a more 
wide-ranging and robust national interest in protecting its 
borders. Although this interest was first framed in both statutes 
and case law in racial and national origins terms, and has 
maintained this inflection in some form or another through today, 
it quickly expanded to a more general authority. Under this 
version of the plenary power doctrine, the executive and 
legislative branches of the federal government had the sole power 
to make decisions regarding immigration with very little 
interference from either the states or the federal judiciary. 
Despite the widespread understanding that a man had the right to 
the services of his wife and custody and control of his children, 
over time, this right to family unity, still largely extra-
constitutional in its framing, was outweighed by the plenary 
power doctrine espoused by the courts. 
The first hints of just how broad plenary power could become 
came with the Emergency Quota Act of 1921 and the National 
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Origins Act of 1924.59 Although Chinese laborers had been 
excluded decades before, these acts were the first that set forth 
quotas for all immigrants, regardless of their nation of origin. 
These quotas were wildly different depending on the national 
origin of the migrant, and were the backbone of a racist 
immigration regime that persisted until Congress, urged on by 
President Johnson, repealed the quota acts in 1965.60 To be sure, 
the quotas privileged family members in the immigration process, 
and wives had preferred status.61 For our purposes, the truly 
remarkable change ushered in by these quotas was the 
assumption made by Congress that it could restrict family 
migration, even the migration of families who were monogamous, 
Christian, and “civilized.”62 
The implementation of these quotas sometimes told a 
different story. Judges were reluctant to impose them, and almost 
immediately began to create loopholes.63 Over time, however, the 
U.S. Supreme Court bolstered the plenary power doctrine by 
upholding congressional and executive action even where it was 
arbitrary and even where it resulted in the tearing apart of 
established families. Two cases in particular from the 1950s are 
illustrative of this trend. 
In Knauff v. Shaughnessy, a German-born wife of a 
naturalized citizen was excluded from the U.S. without a hearing 
on the ground that her admission would be “prejudicial to the 
interests of the United States.”64 The government claimed 
national security interests were paramount due to “the national 
emergency of World War II.”65 Ms. Knauff did not make a claim 
that her marriage was constitutionally protected.66 Indeed, there 
 
 59. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-130, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153.; Emergency 
Quota Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5, repealed by Immigration Act of 1924, 
43 Stat. 153. 
 60. Hart-Celler Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965). 
 61. Kerry Abrams, What Makes the Family Special?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 12 (2012). 
 62. Id. at 12–14 (discussing effects of these acts on family migration). 
 63. See Kerry Abrams, Peaceful Penetration: Proxy Marriage, Same-Sex Marriage, 
and Recognition, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 141, 156–162 (discussing judicial overriding of 
1921 Quota Act for wives of immigrants who would otherwise have been excludable). 
 64. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 539 (1950). 
 65. Id. at 544. 
 66. Id. at 542 (discussing plaintiff’s claim that the statute in question and 
accompanying regulations contained unconstitutional delegations of legislative power). 
See also Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 
YALE L.J. 458, 475 (2009) (noting that in Knauff the Court found that the right to exclude 
aliens “stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to 
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was no constitutional protection for marriage at this time; it would 
be seventeen more years before Loving v. Virginia ushered in a 
new era of constitutionalized family law.67 Instead, she made a 
structural constitutional claim, arguing that the regulations used 
were not “reasonable” and unconstitutionally delegated 
legislative power to the executive.68 The Court denied Knauff’s 
claim, citing the exclusion-era cases, including Nishamura Ekiu. 
“It is not within the province of any court,” it explained, “to 
review the determination of the political branch . . . to exclude a 
given alien.”69 
Three years later in Shaughnessy v. Mezei, the Supreme 
Court upheld the exclusion of another noncitizen, also the spouse 
of a U.S. citizen.70 There, Mr. Mezei, a resident of the United 
States, had left to visit his dying mother in Romania.71 He was 
denied permission to enter, and was delayed for nineteen months 
while he tried to get exit papers to leave Hungary.72 When he 
attempted to reenter the U.S., he was detained on Ellis Island. 
Because no other country would take him, unlike Ellen Knauff, 
he could not leave Ellis Island.73 In Mezei, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its holding in Knauff, finding that “[w]hatever the 
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process”—even if 
the process was no process at all.74 This stunning articulation of 
plenary power as absolute control over borders arguably marks 
the height of the doctrine. Mezei’s nascent family reunification 
claim (his wife was living in upstate New York and he was 
attempting to return to the United States after living there for 
years) is not even mentioned by the dissent in that case. 
Even at the height of plenary power, however, the idea of 
family rights still held a cherished place in the popular 
imagination. Both Knauff and Mezei provoked controversy. 
Congress held hearings in which Ellen Knauff testified and was 
 
control the foreign affairs of the nation” and characterizing this holding as “in tension with 
conventional understandings of separation of powers”). 
 67. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 68. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 69. 338 U.S. at 543. 
 70. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 217 (1953) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (stating that “he wanted to go to his wife and home in Buffalo”). 
 71. Id. at 208 (majority opinion). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the 
Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 935, 965–66 (1995). 
 74. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212. 
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ultimately granted a full exclusion hearing by the Bureau of 
Special Inquiry, and an appeal to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals—exactly what she had asked for in her Supreme Court 
case.75 The hearings revealed that the government had relied on 
hearsay and misinformation in reaching its conclusion that Knauff 
was engaged in espionage. The Board ordered that she be 
admitted to the U.S. as a permanent resident. She later sought 
U.S. citizenship, which the government also fought, and rather 
than continue litigating the issue, she lived out her days a 
permanent resident, but not a citizen, of the United States.76 
Mezei was less successful but was also ultimately released. He had 
been convicted of possessing stolen goods (sacks of flour during 
the Great Depression), which was a “crime of moral turpitude,” a 
ground for exclusion, and had attended meetings with 
communists.77 But his lawyer made a good case that he did not 
deserve to live out his life a prisoner on Ellis Island, and the 
Attorney General paroled him into the United States.78 
If Mezei and Knauff show the importance of the Cold War 
and national security to bolstering the plenary power doctrine, 
Lutwak v. United States shows how changing notions of family 
weakened the family unity principle.79 Lutwak, decided in the 
same term as Mezei, involved several United States citizens who 
married Polish concentration camp survivors in an attempt to get 
them legal immigration status under the War Brides Act.80 
Lutwak posed a problem for the Court: the marriages might well 
be valid under a formal family law test, yet they seemed to be 
intended to circumvent immigration law.81 The conspirators had 
been indicted for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud, but only 
two of the three couples were convicted.82 One of the defendants 
was acquitted, most likely because he and his new wife began 
cohabiting after he was indicted, calling into question—at least for 
 
 75. Weisselberg, supra note 73, at 961–64 (1995). 
 76. Id. at 964 n.165. 
 77. Id. at 976–83. 
 78. Id. at 984. 
 79. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953). 
 80. See War Brides Act of Dec. 28, 1945, Pub. L. 271, ch. 591, 59 Stat. 659 (1945). See 
also ARISTIDE ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN 304–305 (2006) (outlining history of the 
United States’ refusal to provide refuge to displaced persons after World War II). 
 81. Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 609–10. 
 82. Id. at 605. 
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the jury—whether their marriage was really a “sham.”83 They 
apparently expressed the wish, at trial, to remain married to each 
other.84 
The marital unity principle had assumed that marriage was a 
hierarchical status relationship that produced gendered citizens. 
Importantly, marriage was the only legal space for sexual 
relations,85 and despite the fact that spouses did sometimes 
divorce or separate, it was also understood to be permanent.86 But 
in the twentieth century, this common understanding slowly 
changed. Marriage began to be understood as an expression of 
self-authorship, reflecting a person’s individuality rather than 
conformity.87 The rigid gender roles assigned to spouses were 
undermined, both by behavior and through law. This notion, 
however, had not yet calcified into a constitutional right. Instead, 
at this point in time, marriage as self-expression was a threatening 
idea, because it gave control to spouses to define what it meant 
for them, rather than what it contributed to society. Instead of 
being the bedrock of a defined social structure, marriage could be 
used to undermine these very structures. 
This tension can be seen in the Court’s approach to affirming 
the Lutwak defendants’ guilt. At the time Lutwak was decided, 
the only existing doctrine available for determining questions of 
marriage fraud was the “essentials of the marriage” test from 
annulment law.88 This test required that one party to the marriage 
seek an annulment based on his or her spouse’s premarital 
misrepresentations about his or her willingness to engage in 
sexual activity or procreation.89 That test didn’t fit well on 
Lutwak’s facts: none of the conspirators had been duped into 
 
 83. See Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer 
Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 669, 706 (1997) (arguing that a 
“fair construction of the acquittal is that the jury must have been convinced by the evidence 
presented that the marriage, regardless of the intent of the parties at the time they married, 
had become, by the time of the trial, a ‘valid’ marriage”). 
 84. See Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 621 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting that at trial the 
parties expressed their desire to stay married and were acquitted). 
 85. Anne Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 21–25 (1998). 
 86. For a history of spousal separation, see HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN 
AMERICA (2000). 
 87. See Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, A Right Not To Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1509, 1530–33 (2016). 
 88. For an extended analysis of the “essentials” test, see Kerry Abrams, The End of 
Annulment, 16 J. GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 681 (2013). 
 89. Id. at 686. 
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thinking that any of these marriages were about anything other 
than getting refugees safely out of Europe. The only other 
available doctrine was the slim line of cases holding that a 
marriage made in jest was not a valid marriage.90 Indeed, in its 
opinion upholding the jury verdicts against the convicted 
conspirators, the Seventh Circuit made a somewhat ham-handed 
attempt at using the “jest” exception to describe the Lutwak 
facts.91 It was not only marriages made in jest that were void, 
according to that court, but also marriages in which the parties did 
not “assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, 
and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a preten[s]e, or 
cover, to deceive others.”92 Of course, this statement was not true: 
“shotgun” weddings and other marriages for a particular purpose 
were marriages designed precisely to “cover or deceive others,”93 
and there was nothing invalid about these; in fact, marriage was 
often the “punishment” for the crime of seduction in nineteenth-
century family law.94 
The Supreme Court upheld the Seventh Circuit’s decision, 
but not on the theory the lower court had used. Understanding 
that annulment doctrine was inapposite to the facts at hand, the 
Court declared the actual legal validity of the marriages 
immaterial to the question of fraud. “No one is being prosecuted 
for an offense against the marital relation,” Justice Minton 
explained.95 Instead, the offense was that the parties had used the 
institution of marriage in order to gain a benefit they did not 
deserve.96 The marriages themselves might be legally valid, but 
that would not stop the government from prosecuting the parties 
for immigration fraud. The government did not need to defer to 
the individuals’ understanding of what their marriage meant to 
them. Instead, it could impose its own view of what marriage was 
supposed to mean and deny the couple the benefits of marital 
status if they were found wanting. As the Court put it in Lutwak, 
 
 90. For a discussion of the jest exception, see Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012). 
 91. See United States v. Lutwak, 195 F. 2d 748 (7th Cir. 1952). 
 92. Id. at 753–54. See also Rubenstein v. United States, 151 F. 2d 915, 918–19 (1945) 
(making the same claim). 
 93. See Abrams, supra note 90, at 12. 
 94. Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24 (2012). See 
also Abrams, supra note 90, at 12 (discussing “limited purpose” marriages). 
 95. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 611 (1953). 
 96. Id. 
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“the common understanding of a marriage, which Congress must 
have had in mind when it made provision for ‘alien spouses’ in the 
War Brides Act, is that the two parties have undertaken to 
establish a life together and assume certain duties and 
obligations.”97 
Taken together, Knauff, Mezei, and Lutwak represent a shift 
in the interaction of family rights and immigration power. These 
cases, occurring after the trauma of World War II and the 
beginnings of the Cold War, were decided in a context of high 
anxiety over borders and infiltration. A spouse might not be just 
a spouse but a spy. At the same time, the meaning of marriage was 
shifting. Divorce was increasingly available, and, toward the end 
of this period, nonmarital births increased. Marriage was 
becoming more individualistic and less central to the social order. 
Indeed, we can see in the Knauff, Mezei, and Lutwak 
dissents, all written by Justice Jackson, the seeds of a new 
understanding of both family rights and immigration power. In his 
Knauff dissent, Justice Jackson articulated a family reunification 
rationale for Knauff’s claims. Congress, he argued, has the power 
to exclude aliens. But it did not have the power to authorize “an 
abrupt and brutal exclusion of the wife of an American citizen 
without a hearing.”98 Justice Jackson painted a stark picture of the 
injustice he saw in the government’s treatment of the Knauffs—
”Now this American citizen is told he cannot bring his wife to the 
United States, but he will not be told why,”—and the 
consequences of this treatment—”He must abandon his bride to 
live in his own country or forsake his country to live with his 
bride.”99 Regarding the claim that national security was at stake, 
Justice Jackson expressed skepticism. 
Security is like liberty, in that many crimes are committed in its 
name. The menace to the security of this country, be it great as 
it may, from this girl’s admission is as nothing compared to the 
menace to free institutions inherent in the procedures of this 
pattern. . . . 
. . . 
 
 97. Id. at 611. 
 98. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 550 (1950) (Jackson, 
J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. at 550–51. 
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I should direct the Attorney General either to produce his 
evidence justifying exclusion or to admit Mrs. Knauff to the 
country.100 
Similarly, in Lutwak, Justice Jackson worried about the 
effects of creating a new class of crimes based on marriage. How 
could it be a criminal act, he queried, to enter into a legally valid 
marriage?101 If anyone had standing to contest the validity of the 
marriage, it was the spouses, because a fraudulent marriage, 
unlike a bigamous or incestuous marriage, is voidable, not void.102 
The fact, he remarked, that the couple who had decided to stay 
together had been acquitted, and “no one contends that their 
marriage is void,” further supported the idea that it was up to the 
spouses, not the government, to determine whether the marriages 
were valid.103 Wouldn’t these parties be just as subject to 
prosecution if they held themselves out as single, since they had 
been married in what appeared to be valid ceremonies?104 
III. THE AGE OF BALANCING 
We now come to our third, and final, age, one that I have 
termed the “age of balancing.” In contrast to the approaches in 
the two earlier ages, courts today recognize the importance of 
family ties and even recognize them as a constitutional liberty 
interest, while simultaneously recognizing the importance of 
national security interests. This recognition is beginning to lead to 
a more nuanced analysis in specific cases, with an understanding 
that even a right as important as family unity can be overridden 
by security concerns but that the bald claim of “national security” 
without more does not automatically override family interests. 
In the last twenty years, two major shifts have occurred which 
have further reworked the balance between individual family 
rights and the federal immigration power. First, family rights have 
become constitutionalized. Second, the Supreme Court has 
expressed increasing skepticism that plenary power over 
immigration means that courts have no role whatsoever to play in 
evaluating the constitutionality of immigration law and 
 
 100. Id. at 551–52. 
 101. Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 620 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 102. Id. at 621. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. A married person could be prosecuted if he held himself out as single if, for 
example, he tried to marry another, violating the criminal bigamy statutes. 
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enforcement. Together, these two trends have put family rights in 
a stronger position than they were mid-century. To be sure, family 
rights never absolutely outweigh immigration concerns today, and 
there has yet to be a case that expressly constitutionalizes the right 
to family reunification in the United States. The Court, however, 
has indicated in multiple recent cases that the interest in family 
reunification is an important factor in constitutional adjudication. 
In other words, rather than assuming that the immigration power 
always outweighs family rights or that family rights outweigh the 
immigration power, the Court balances the interests of individuals 
with the interests of the state. 
A. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FAMILY RIGHTS 
As with many other areas of law, the twentieth century 
introduced a new attention to individual rights in family law.105 
This transformation did not occur overnight. It began with the 
parental rights cases of the 1920s,106 but did not fully develop until 
mid-century, when these rights were further entrenched and 
expanded.107 Beginning in the 1960s, the Warren Court, in the 
words of Professor David Meyer, “ushered in a dramatically 
different understanding of the relationship between family law 
and the Constitution.”108 The application of the Fourteenth 
 
 105. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, 
AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 88–89 (1989). 
 106. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (affirming lower court’s 
decision to enjoin enforcement of the Oregon Compulsory Education Act because it 
“unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing 
and education of children under their control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) 
(holding it unconstitutional to prohibit teaching in languages other than English until the 
student passes the eighth grade). The Court recognizes the right to “establish a home and 
bring up children” as one which “may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting 
the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation 
to some [state] purpose.” Id. at 399–400. 
 107. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846–47 
(1977) (“Whatever liberty interest might otherwise exist in the foster family as an 
institution, that interest must be substantially attenuated where the proposed removal 
from the foster family is to return the child to his natural parents.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that it was unconstitutional to compel Amish parents to send 
their children to high school until the age of 16 under Wisconsin’s compulsory education 
law, due to parental interest in raising their children in accordance with their religious 
beliefs); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (holding that while the rights of 
parents are not beyond limitation, “[i]t is cardinal with [the Court] that the custody, care 
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents . . . [in a] private realm of family life 
which the state cannot enter”). 
 108. David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 529, 533 
(2008). 
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Amendment values of liberty and equality to a variety of family 
law issues led to constitutional decisions “declaring a fundamental 
right to marry, ensuring access to divorce, curbing discrimination 
based on sex and illegitimacy, and recognizing new rights for 
children and unwed fathers.”109 Marriage, thought one hundred 
years ago to be a “public institution,” now took on another 
dimension, a right that could be articulated by an individual 
person.110 And parental rights also took on constitutional stature, 
to the point where statutes that offered visitation even to 
grandparents could be struck down as infringing on a parent’s 
right to care, custody, and control of his or her children.111 
Professor Meyer has observed that nearly all of these cases 
sounded in one or both of two registers: equality or autonomy.112 
Each of these concepts would have seemed inapposite in the 
family context to the courts of the nineteenth century. Consider 
again, for example, Myra Bradwell’s claim, referenced earlier, 
that she should be admitted to the Illinois bar.113 The notion that 
men and women were similarly situated and should be treated 
equally received no traction with the Court, nor did the notion 
that she was an autonomous individual with the right to pursue a 
profession regardless of her sex or marital status.114 In contrast, 
constitutionalized family rights have focused on the individual’s 
ability to operate autonomously and free from discrimination. 
Whether the issue is the right to marry, the right to the care, 
custody, and control of one’s children, or the right of access to 
 
 109. Id. at 529. 
 110. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 
(1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 111. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72–73 (2000) (holding that “the Due Process 
Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make 
childrearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be 
made”). 
 112. Meyer, supra note 108, at 533–34. 
 113. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1873). 
 114. It is notable that Bradwell’s claim was brought under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, which some hoped would become a vehicle for the incorporation of 
common law property and contract rights into constitutional rights. See Rebecca E. 
Zeitlow, Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Bingham’s Theory of 
Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717, 747 (2003) (discussing the Slaughterhouse Cases). Like 
the claimants in the Slaughterhouse Cases, Bradwell claimed that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause required the federal government to protect her fundamental rights. See 
Bradwell, 530 U.S. at 137. Her claim, however, was radical for the time as women lost their 
contract and property rights upon marriage. See id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
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divorce, the focus is on the individual’s choice, rather than the 
rights that accompany occupying a place in a status hierarchy.115 
Constitutional family rights have had some curious features. 
In particular, they have been marked by a vagueness, both about 
the source of the right and its scope, unusual for constitutional 
law. Although this feature has sometimes been critiqued as a 
symptom of doctrinal confusion or even as evidence that 
constitutional family rights are invented or meritless, Professor 
Meyer suggests an alternative reading. Family rights are more 
difficult than some others to understand as individual rights 
claims because the state interest often stands in for the 
unrepresented interests of nonparties, for example, children, 
fetuses, co-parents, or ex-spouses.116 As Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor observed, in families, “the rights of individuals are 
intertwined, and the family itself has a collective personality.”117 
Thus, according to Professor Meyer, we see the Court “eschewing 
strict scrutiny’s focus on compelling interests and narrow tailoring 
for far more indeterminate, intermediate interest-balancing.”118 
The result is a constitutionalized family law, but one in which 
balancing tests and fuzzy standards, rather than rigid rules, are the 
norm.119 
Our most recent example of the constitutionalization of 
family law is the Court’s 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.120 
There, the Court struck down state statutes banning same-sex 
marriage, using the equality and autonomy principles shared by 
the other constitutional family cases. The majority opinion 
authored by Justice Kennedy, in fact, emphasizes the autonomy 
principle to a remarkable degree (“personal choice regarding 
 
 115. To be sure, gendered notions of the appropriate sphere for women did not end 
with Bradwell. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (holding that since the 
profession of bartending could potentially lead to moral and social problems for women, 
it was within the state’s power to bar a woman from working as a bartender unless the bar 
was owned by her husband or father). 
 116. Meyer, supra note 108, at 531. 
 117. Sandra Day O’Connor, The Supreme Court and the Family, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
573, 576 (2001). 
 118. Meyer, supra note 108, at 568. 
 119. Id. at 531 (noting that “as courts broaden the circle of constitutional protection 
and undertake to mediate the sometimes conflicting interests of an expanding pool of 
rights-holders, they will increasingly find themselves engaging in flexible, fact-sensitive 
interest-balancing of a sort that fundamentally recalls ‘pre-constitutional’ family law”). 
 120. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy”)121 
while simultaneously invoking the common law understanding of 
the purpose of the family (“this Court’s cases and the Nation’s 
traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of the Nation’s 
social order”).122 
Constitutionalized family law, then, gives individuals rights 
vis-à-vis other individuals. These rights are often articulated as 
rights to access (access to marriage, access to divorce, access to 
parentage, access to custody—even access to abortion). The rights 
are conferred not based on membership in a status group 
(husbands, parents, “free white persons,” but instead because of 
one’s personhood, in Obergefell’s terms, “dignity”). But these 
rights, while more focused on the individual and more broadly 
applicable than common law family rights, are ripe for balancing 
against other interests. 
B. THE SOFTENING OF PLENARY POWER 
Simultaneous with the constitutionalization of family law has 
been the softening of the rigid plenary power doctrine of mid-
century. To be sure, the concept of plenary power still operates in 
immigration law. But it has weakened from the 1950s, when the 
Knauff and Mezei Courts could unselfconsciously hold that 
“[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due 
process.”123 
Several factors contributed to the softening of plenary power. 
Especially crucial was the Court’s 1976 decision in Mathews v. 
Eldridge that articulated a new test for determining whether 
procedural due process had been given. Mathews essentially 
requires a court to balance three issues—the importance of the 
private interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest 
if the government’s proposed procedures are used, and the 
government’s interest.124 The Mathews test opened up a new 
constitutional space in which an individual’s fundamental right 
was not a trump card, but instead a factor to be considered in light 
of government interests in regulation. 
 
 121. Id. at 2589. 
 122. Id. at 2590. 
 123. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). 
 124. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
ABRAMS_DRAFT 6.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/6/17 5:35 PM 
270 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 32:247 
 
After Mathews, some legal scholars were concerned that the 
doctrine would undermine fundamental rights. Rights that had 
seemed absolute could now be balanced against the government’s 
interest in curtailing them, such that “balancing [could] lead to the 
anomalous result that an individual will have a clear due process 
right to no process.”125 In immigration law, however, where the 
norm was “no process,” the Mathews test offered a new hope. The 
application of Mathews to the immigration context was obvious: 
in almost any immigration dispute, an individual’s interest in 
entering or remaining in the country conflicted with the 
government’s interest in efficient exclusion or removal. In 1982, 
the Court adopted the new balancing approach in Landon v. 
Plasencia, where it applied the Mathews test to hold that a 
permanent resident who transported aliens illegally across the 
border had not received adequate due process at her exclusion 
hearing.126 But the Plasencia Court stopped short of overruling 
Knauff, a failure that did not go unnoticed. Professor Gerald 
Neuman wrote that the Plasencia Court “recognized the weighty 
interest of a lawful permanent resident in remaining in the United 
States, but it also emphasized the weighty interest of the 
government in efficient administration of the immigration laws” 
and concluded, “[w]ith that alternative analysis available, the 
Knauff doctrine is not only brutal, but unnecessary.”127 
Even in instances where the Court did not explicitly adopt 
the Mathews test, it did begin to find ways to adjudicate 
immigration cases without overruling the plenary power doctrine 
head-on. In many cases it interpreted statutes using what 
Professor Hiroshi Motomura termed “phantom constitutional 
norms,” thus avoiding the plenary power doctrine but upholding 
the rights of immigrants.128 Consider, for example, Zadvydas v. 
Davis, a case in which the Court held that an alien could not be 
detained indefinitely if unlikely to be removed in the foreseeable 
 
 125. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the 
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 472 (1986). 
 126. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982). 
 127. Gerald. L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of 
Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 1053 (1998). 
 128. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: 
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549–60 
(1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court has undermined the plenary power doctrine by 
rendering “subconstitutional” decisions in statutory interpretation cases). 
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future.129 On its face, the text of the statute in question did not 
provide a time limit for detention. Rather than strike down the 
statute as unconstitutional, Justice Breyer, read into the statute a 
six-month limit on detention.130 In doing so, he referenced the 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance: “when an Act of Congress 
raises ‘a serious doubt’ as to its constitutionality, ‘this Court will 
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly 
possible by which the question may be avoided.’”131 
The Zadvydas majority also made another important move 
that distinguishes that case from Knauff, Mezei, and other early 
plenary power cases. The majority did not treat the political 
branches’ authority over immigration as monolithic but instead as 
closely linked to foreign affairs and national security interests. 
Thus, rather than simply defer because the subject of 
“immigration” was at issue, the Court examined the foreign 
affairs or national security issue at play in the case and considered 
it in light of the individual’s liberty interest in not be indefinitely 
detained. In Zadvydas, the legitimate government foreign policy 
interest was in the “‘sensitive’ repatriation negotiations” in which 
the executive branch might be engaged with countries that might 
agree to repatriate the detained aliens.132 The Court found no 
evidence that a habeas court’s hearing a claim of unlawful 
indefinite detention would harm these negotiations.133 
Plenary power is still very much alive. Courts give much 
greater deference to the executive and legislative branches in 
cases involving immigration, especially in cases involving 
immigrants who are outside the country or who have not yet been 
granted lawful permanent residency. But the shifts that have 
occurred in the last fifty years have made the doctrine more 
malleable and nuanced. Courts are now able to consider both the 
strength of the individual rights claim made by a citizen or 
 
 129. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (reading statute to forbid indefinite 
detention of aliens who are unlikely to be removed in the foreseeable future). 
 130. Id. at 701. 
 131. Id. at 689 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)). Justice Breyer chose six 
months as the time limit because Congress had assumed in a previous statement that a 
lesser time might be unconstitutional. We do have reason to believe, however, that 
Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six months. 
Zadvydas at 701 (citing Juris. Statement of United States in United States v. Witkovich, O. 
T. 1956, No. 295, pp. 8–9). 
 132. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696. 
 133. Id. at 696. 
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immigrant and to interrogate with specificity the government 
interest asserted. This approach leads to a balancing of interests 
rather than a rigid rule of deference to the political branches. 
C. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND MODIFIED PLENARY POWER 
So, what happens today when individuals make family 
reunification claims and Congress or the executive counters with 
a demand that courts defer to its immigration power? In order to 
see the difference between the new “age of balancing” and the 
“age of the security state,” let us examine the cases from the 1970s 
until today that have pitted family rights against immigration 
authority. 
Our story begins with Fiallo v. Bell, a 1977 case in which three 
sets of fathers and their nonmarital children brought equal 
protection challenges to provisions of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”) defining the words “parent” and “child” 
for immigration purposes.134 Under the statute as then-written, 
these fathers did not quality as “parents” and their sons did not 
qualify as “children” because the fathers had not formally 
legitimated them. Had the American citizen or resident parents 
been mothers, not fathers, the relationships would have been 
recognized for immigration purposes. Fiallo was argued during 
the heyday of equal protection challenges of both gendered 
statutes and statutes discriminating on the basis of “illegitimacy.” 
The statute in question in Fiallo did both at once.135 Despite its 
rejection of statutes discriminating on the basis of gender or 
illegitimacy in other contexts and its application of an emerging 
standard of “intermediate scrutiny” in those instances, the Fiallo 
court refused to apply heightened scrutiny in the immigration 
context. Instead, it held that even though 
it could be argued that the line should have been drawn at a 
different point and that the statutory definitions deny 
preferential status to parents and children who share strong 
family ties . . . it is clear from our cases . . . that these are policy 
questions entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our 
Government, and we have no judicial authority to substitute 
our political judgment for that of the Congress.136 
 
 134. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
 135. Id. at 794 (citing petitioners’ argument that the discrimination against them was 
“double-barreled” discrimination). 
 136. Id. at 798. 
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Fiallo appears at first glance to be a simple affirmation of the 
plenary power doctrine in the extreme form in which it appeared 
in Knauff and Mezei. But a closer reading reveals a crack in the 
doctrine. Replying to dissenting Justice Marshall’s argument that 
Fiallo required heightened scrutiny because it involved claims 
made by American citizens, Justice Powell, writing for the 
majority, cited Kleindeinst v. Mandel, a 1972 case in which 
American professors claimed a First Amendment associational 
right to meet with a visiting scholar in person on U.S. soil. In 
denying this claim, the Court held that 
when the Executive exercises this [delegated] power negatively 
on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the 
courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, 
nor test it by balancing its justification against the First 
Amendment interests of those who seek personal 
communication with the applicant” . . . [w]e can see no reason 
to review the broad congressional policy choice at issue here 
under a more exacting standard.137 
In other words, under Mandel and Fiallo, the Court does not 
give exacting scrutiny or engage in direct balancing between the 
individual interest and the government interest. Instead, the 
government gets the first crack at framing its decision to exclude 
an immigrant as “facially legitimate and bona fide,” and once it 
has done so, the individual does not have an opportunity to claim 
discrimination. 
This articulation of the plenary power doctrine, while still 
affording great deference to Congress, differs significantly from 
that set forth in Knauff and Mezei. There, that “[w]hatever the 
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process.”138 Here, 
the alleged purpose of the law had to be based on a “facially 
legitimate and bona fide reason,” potentially opening the door for 
the striking down of statutes not based on “facially legitimate” or 
“bona fide” reasons. Gerald Neuman interpreted this language as 
“roughly equivalent to the rational basis test”—surely a step up 
from no scrutiny at all.139 This version of plenary power also puts 
Congress above the executive in importance, treating the 
executive’s power over immigration as “delegated” from 
 
 137. Id. at 794–95 (citing Kleindeinst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972)). 
 138. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). 
 139. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1839 n.31 (1993). 
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Congress rather than independently held. Indeed, in the years 
since Mandel and Fiallo, the rational basis test itself has become 
much more capable of invalidating statutes than it used to be. In 
cases such as Romer v. Evans and United States v. Windsor, the 
Court invalidated statutes because they were animated by a “bare 
desire to harm” individual people.140 If Fiallo stands for the 
principle that, in the immigration context, discrimination claims 
get rational basis review, Romer and Windsor show us that 
rational basis review is not a green light for the statute’s 
constitutionality. 
Despite its nuancing of the plenary power doctrine, Fiallo 
usually has been interpreted as supporting plenary power 
principles.141 None of the families who brought claims in the case 
prevailed. This was a disappointing result for those who wanted 
the courts to be robust defenders of equal protection. The Court’s 
opinion was also disappointing to those who had hoped that the 
claim of constitutional family rights could outweigh the political 
branches’ immigration authority.142 
By the time the Court again considered sections of the INA 
that discriminated based on gender and illegitimacy, however, the 
constitutional architecture of gender discrimination claims was 
more firmly fixed. In Nguyen v. INS, the majority opinion was 
able to state with confidence that “in order to pass constitutional 
muster, the statutory provision must be substantially related to 
the achievement of important governmental objectives”—the 
now-standard “intermediate scrutiny” test.143 Nguyen involved 
 
 140. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down Defense of 
Marriage Act and finding evidence of a “bare desire to harm” gay and lesbian couples in 
the legislative history of the act); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down 
Colorado Constitutional Amendment 2, which banned the state and its municipalities from 
treating sexual orientation as a protected class and holding that the law in question’s “sheer 
breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems 
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational 
relationship to legitimate state interests”). 
 141. See, e.g., Kristin A. Collins, Deference and Deferral: Constitutional Structure and 
the Durability of Gender-Based Nationality Laws, in THE PUBLIC LAW OF GENDER 73, 73–
98, 77 (Kim Rubenstein & Katharine G. Young eds., 2016) (describing Fiallo as “an 
important plenary power case” and examining the relationship between the Court’s 
decision and subsequent Congressional action). 
 142. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 
624, 649 n.123 (1980) (describing Fiallo as “[a] case in which the Court got this subject all 
wrong”). 
 143. In Nguyen v. INS, the majority was able to state with confidence that “[f]or a 
gender-based classification to withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established 
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the provision in the INA that required legitimation or other 
stringent proofs of paternity in order for fathers to transmit 
citizenship to their nonmarital children born abroad without 
similar requirements for citizenship transmittal by U.S. mothers 
to their foreign-born, nonmarital children. The majority found 
that the differential treatment of fathers and mothers in the 
statute passed intermediate scrutiny because of the biological 
differences between men and women: “in the case of the mother, 
the relation is verifiable from the birth itself” but in the “case of 
the father, the uncontestable fact is that he need not be present at 
the birth” and could therefore be required to demonstrate 
fatherhood through other means.144 
Although Nguyen was a blow to advocates of gender 
equality, it may have represented yet another chink in the armor 
of plenary power. Rather than invoke the doctrine, the Court 
chose to treat the claim as a straight-up gender discrimination 
claim, and applied intermediate scrutiny with no mention of 
giving deference to a “facially legitimate” or “bona fide” reason 
as in Fiallo. The reasons for this were not clear. It is possible that 
the Court did not believe that the plenary power doctrine applied 
to a case concerning citizenship, rather than immigration. But it is 
also possible that the Court did not believe it appropriate to apply 
plenary power principles to a case involving family relationships 
that bore such a tenuous relationship to national security.145 
More recently, additional evidence has mounted that the 
Supreme Court no longer views plenary power as a doctrine that 
always trumps family claims. In 2010, it heard the case of Flores-
Villar v. United States, another challenge to the INA’s derivative 
citizenship provisions.146 In this case, which concerned differential 
residency requirements for nonmarital fathers and nonmarital 
mothers, it was much more difficult for the government to assert 
 
at least that the [challenged] classification” serves important governmental objectives and 
that the discriminatory means employed are “substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives.” Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 144. Id. at 62. 
 145. For a version of this argument, see Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the 
Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1708 (2007) (urging courts to consider 
“whether the immigration provision in question is advancing core immigration policy goals 
or instead has ventured outside these goals into an area that has traditionally been within 
the province of the states”). 
 146. Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210 (2011). 
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a biological difference between men and women that would 
survive intermediate scrutiny. Why would U.S. citizen mothers be 
more likely to be loyal to the United States after one year of 
residence than U.S. citizen fathers? The court, absent Justice 
Kagan who recused herself based on her previous involvement in 
the case, split 4-4 and issued a per curiam affirmation of the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion with no opinion. Although this decision meant 
that the law did not change, it was a hint that at least four 
members of the Court—likely including Justice Kennedy, the 
author of Nguyen—believed neither that the statute was justified 
under intermediate scrutiny nor that the case required the 
expansive discretion afforded under the plenary power doctrine. 
As Kevin Johnson put it soon afterward: “A near-majority of the 
Court, which would likely have been a majority if Justice Kagan 
had not recused herself, appeared to be ready to limit, if not 
eliminate, the scope of the doctrine.”147 
This development came to fruition in 2017, when the Court 
issued its opinion in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, a case that was 
factually very similar to Flores-Villar and one that challenges the 
differential residency requirements for men and women.148 At 
oral argument, the Justices seemed uninterested in hearing 
plenary power arguments; the government’s attorney attempted 
twice to frame the case as one about “Congress’s plenary 
authority” but the Justices quickly turned the conversation to 
scrutiny of the government’s stated interests in the case and 
whether gender or illegitimacy discrimination existed.149 In her 
majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg adopted this approach. 
Applying the intermediate scrutiny standard usually employed in 
gender discrimination cases, the Court struck down what it 
characterized as a “stunningly anachronistic law.”150 
Nguyen, Flores-Villar, and Morales-Santana, of course, are all 
cases about derivative citizenship, not about immigration. 
Although derivative citizenship and immigration cases flow from 
the same statute, the Immigration and Nationality Act, there is an 
argument that derivative citizenship cases are simply not subject 
 
 147. Kevin Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009-2013: A New Era of 
Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 78 (2015). 
 148. Sessions, Attorney General v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191 (U.S. June 12, 
2017). 
 149. Oral Argument, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, (U.S. No. 15-1191) https://www.
oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1191. 
 150. Morales-Santana,  slip op. at 14. 
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to the plenary power doctrine, because they concern a person’s 
identity at birth, not their desirability as an immigrant. Individuals 
born on American soil are similarly citizens under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and the political branches 
of the federal government have no authority to divest them of 
citizenship based on national security or foreign affairs concerns. 
Derivative citizens are arguably similar—members of our 
community whether the government likes it or not. (A potential 
counterargument is that, absent statute, they would not be citizens 
at all, and the statute must come from Congress.) So, assuming for 
the moment that we can discount the holdings in Nguyen and 
Flores-Villar and the prospective holding in Morales-Santana, 
where do Knauff, Mezei, and Fiallo stand today? The answer is 
that, although they have not been directly overruled, they have 
been substantially undermined through the general softening of 
the plenary power doctrine as discussed above, and in particular 
through the Court’s holding in Kerry v. Din, a 2015 case in which 
the Court considered a family reunification case brought by a U.S. 
citizen woman. 
In Din, Fauzia Din, a naturalized U.S. citizen who had come 
to the United States as a refugee from Afghanistan, petitioned for 
a visa for her husband, Kanishka Berashk.151 His visa was denied, 
and the only reason given was reference to the page and a half-
long anti-terrorism provision of the INA, a broad provision of the 
statute that makes a person inadmissible for engaging in activities 
ranging from blowing up a plane to lending money to someone 
who is engaged in terrorist activities. With no way to know what 
facts (true or false) were the basis of the denial, Din sued for a 
better explanation. Her request was not that Berashk be admitted 
but that she receive a better explanation than she had been given, 
presumably so that she could marshal a rebuttal if the government 
had been misinformed. 
First, the bad news for Din: she lost. Five Justices upheld the 
government’s decision to give her only the information that her 
husband was denied admission based on the anti-terrorism 
statute. Justice Scalia wrote a plurality opinion, but garnered only 
two votes in addition to his own. He argued that a spousal 
reunification claim could never be brought successfully under the 
Due Process Clause, regardless of whether terrorism was at 
 
 151. 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2129. 
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issue.152 Justice Breyer, joined by three other Justices, dissented. 
He would have required the Court to apply the Mathews v. 
Eldridge balancing test and consider her request in light of 
government interests.153 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito, concurred. 
Kennedy’s concurrence invokes the same language from Mandel 
relied upon in Fiallo but with an important addition. Once the 
government has offered a “facially legitimate and bona fide 
reason” for its decision, the opinion explains, “‘courts will neither 
look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing 
its justification against’ the constitutional interests of citizens the 
visa denial might implicate.”154 At first glance, this simply sounds 
like Fiallo redux. But then Justice Kennedy adds an important 
caveat: “This reasoning has particular force in the area of national 
security, for which Congress has provided specific statutory 
directions pertaining to visa applications by noncitizens who seek 
entry to this country.”155 Every other inadmissibility provision in 
the INA, he notes, requires the government to indicate the 
“specific provision or provisions of law under which the alien is 
inadmissible,” unless the visa application is denied due to national 
security or terrorism concerns.156 Justice Kennedy’s opinion, while 
rejecting the application of a balancing test by the Court in this 
instance, ratifies the balancing already done in the creation of the 
statute by Congress—providing more individual process where 
national security interests are less prominent—and implies that 
the Court might not be so deferential in a case not so closely 
linked to national security.157 
So what are we to make of Din? Some scholars have seen the 
case as a reaffirmation of the plenary power doctrine.158 Others 
have argued that, although it did not “kill” plenary power, it dealt 
 
 152. Justice Scalia was consistent across cases in his insistence that there is no 
constitutional right to the protection of the family. I explore his jurisprudence in more 
depth in Kerry Abrams, The Rights of Marriage: Obergefell, Din, and the Future of 
Constitutional Family Law, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
 153. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2145 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 154. Id. at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 155. Id. at 2140. 
 156. Id. at 2141 (citing 8 U.S.C. §1182(b)(1) and (3)). 
 157. Justice Kennedy specifically mentions that Din “admits in her Complaint that 
Berashk worked for the Taliban government” and argued that this fact “provides at least 
a facial connection to terrorist activity.” Id. at 2141. 
 158. See David A. Martin, Why the Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. 
REV. 29 (2015). 
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it an important blow. Michael Kagan, for example, has argued 
that “Din’s defeat shows that plenary power is not dead yet. But 
Din came very close, winning four justices.”159 He points out as 
well that Justice Scalia and the two who joined him avoided 
discussing plenary power at all, instead attacking substantive due 
process (also perhaps this was to bolster their dissents in the 
Obergefell opinion, which came down eleven days later). Perhaps 
most important, however, is Justice Kennedy’s willingness in his 
concurrence to assume, for the sake of argument, that Din did 
have a due process interest in her relationship with her spouse.160 
Given his majority opinion in Obergefell, which he was 
presumably drafting simultaneously with his concurrence in Din, 
it would have been difficult to contend that an American citizen 
had no constitutional interest in her own marriage. The question, 
given the constitutional liberty interest enjoyed by Obergefell, 
Din, or anyone, then became not whether Din had such an 
interest, but how it would be balanced against the national 
security interests asserted by the government. For the time being, 
in this particular context of alleged terrorist activity, the result of 
the fractured opinions in Din is that the political branches 
continue to be allowed to engage in that balancing internally. But 
the implication of Kennedy’s Din concurrence is that if the 
political branches stray too far from their national security 
interests, the Court will interfere. 
CONCLUSION 
Scholars have been predicting the end of plenary power for 
decades.161 Around 2000, an avalanche of scholars insinuated that 
the plenary power doctrine was near its demise.162 But, as Kevin 
Johnson has observed, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
Congress imposed “special registration” on Muslims.163 Similarly, 
just after his inauguration as our forty-fifth president, Donald J. 
 
 159. Michael Kagan, Plenary Power is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 22 (2015). 
 160. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 161. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary 
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255 (1984). 
 162. See, e.g., Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of 
Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 
SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1998). 
 163. Johnson, supra note 147, at 61 (citing Registration and Monitoring of Certain 
Nonimmigrants, 65 Fed. Reg. 52584, 52585 (Aug. 12, 2002)). 
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Trump issued an executive order restricting immigration from 
seven majority-Muslim countries.164 The executive order directly 
impacted families with cognizable reunification claims. At this 
juncture, it is impossible to predict with any certainty how our 
current Supreme Court would view a challenge to this type of 
restriction, much less how a Court that includes Trump-appointed 
Justices will view it. 
Two observations bear making, however. The first is that the 
Roberts Court, although often considered to be fairly 
conservative, has overseen a time of expansion of family 
constitutional rights via Windsor and Obergefell and 
simultaneously a time of incremental diminishment of plenary 
power. Professor Johnson recently characterized the Roberts 
Court as one that “consistently has applied ordinary, standard, 
and unremarkable legal doctrines in ordinary, standard, and 
unremarkable ways” in its immigration decisions.165 
Second, constitutional law moves slowly. Although the 
LGBTQ rights movement appears in hindsight to have changed 
public opinion about same-sex marriage overnight, the seeds of 
this sea change were sown when the hierarchical understanding of 
family embraced by the common law began to morph into an 
individual rights-based paradigm. The development of a modern 
family reunification right has occurred slowly but is now ripe 
enough to be poised for affirmative recognition by our courts. If 
the judiciary continues to provide a check on the executive and 
legislative branches—as it has since the founding—we should 
expect to live in the age of balancing for quite some time. 
 
 164. Trump’s Executive Order On Immigration, Annotated, NPR (Jan. 31, 2017, 10:46 
AM), http://www.npr.org/2017/01/31/512439121/trumps-executive-order-on-immigration-
annotated. 
 165. Johnson, supra note 147, at 62. 
